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Abstract
In the context of international interest in reforming mental health payment systems, national policy in England has sought to 
move towards an episodic funding approach. Patients are categorised into care clusters, and providers will be paid for episodes 
of care for patients within each cluster. For the payment system to work, clusters need to be appropriately homogenous in 
terms of financial resource use. We examine variation in costs and activity within clusters and across health care providers. 
We find that the large variation between providers with respect to costs within clusters mean that a cluster-based episodic 
payment system would have substantially different financial impacts across providers.
Keywords Mental health funding · Provider payment · Episodic payment · Variation · Costs
Introduction
There is significant international interest in developing pay-
ment approaches in mental health services that create the 
right incentives to use scarce resources more efficiently 
without compromising care quality (Moran and Jacobs 
2017). Public providers of mental health services in England 
(National Health Service (NHS) Trusts) have historically 
been funded through block contracts agreed between com-
missioners (who purchase care services) and providers of 
care, and usually this has been on the basis of levels of exist-
ing ‘inputs’ such as the number of beds (Mason et al. 2011). 
This method of financing offers little financial incentive for 
providers to efficiently meet health care needs and can have 
perverse incentives for quality of care (Jacobs 2014).
For England, starting in 2012 the Department of Health 
mandated that mental health services move away from block 
contracts and use newly developed care clusters to classify 
patients according to their needs, with payment related to 
episodes of care within a cluster, an approach referred to 
as episodic payment (Department of Health 2010, 2013). 
Implementation of the use of the clusters and development of 
payment models has largely been devolved to local commis-
sioners and providers of mental health care. Subsequently, 
there has been much debate about the use of the clusters with 
hope that the approach had merit, but also caution that much 
more work was needed to understand the implementation of 
care clusters and the development of payment systems based 
on them; a key need being robust analysis of cluster data 
(see, for example, NHS Confederation 2011; Clark 2011; 
Jacobs 2014).
With the sustained focus on the implementation of the 
cluster payment approach over a number of years, there has 
only recently been a more substantial quantity of care cluster 
data available to undertake analysis of the categorisation of 
patients. We contribute to the need for more robust analysis 
of clusters. In this paper we examine nationally available 
cluster data and consider how well the approach to clus-
tering is operating, and reflect on the feasibility of its fur-
ther development as a basis for episodic payment in mental 
health care.
The potential move towards an episodic payment sys-
tem (Khan et al. 2014), would align mental health services 
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more closely to the payment system used for acute physical 
health care in England, formerly called payment by results 
(PbR) but now known as the national tariff payment system 
(NTPS). Potential benefits of an episodic-based payment 
approach are that it increases transparency and accounta-
bility (The Mental Health Taskforce 2016), can incentivise 
providers to control unit costs, and deliver more efficient 
care (Jacobs 2014).
There is international interest in developing new forms 
of payment systems for secondary mental health care but 
experiences have been mixed. Australia and New Zealand 
developed casemix classification systems specific to men-
tal health that incorporated information on patient severity 
and functioning using the Health of the Nation Outcome 
Scales (HoNOS). In both countries providers were shown to 
exhibit cost variations that rendered the classification sys-
tems unsuitable for payment, although this was an explicit 
objective in Australia only (Buckingham et al. 1998; Gaines 
et al. 2003). Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have 
included psychiatric care in the prospective activity-based 
payment system used for physical acute care (Kobel et al. 
2011). This system takes account of the type of care and 
treatment provided as well as diagnosis (Forti et al. 2014). 
Cost control is incentivised by nationally agreed unit prices 
and the system also incentivises quality improvements that 
lead to lower resource consumption (Swan-Tan et al. 2011). 
Other countries have implemented prospective payment but 
chosen an alternative payment unit to the diagnosis casemix 
groups used for acute physical health care, such as in the 
United States which reimburses psychiatric inpatient care 
under Medicare using a per diem system, reflecting the fact 
that length of stay reflects cost (Mason and Goddard 2009).
In contrast to standard casemix systems which fix 
a patients’ categorisation and the payment that will be 
received for their treatment, under the episodic payment 
approach in England, patients are categorised into one of 21 
care clusters according to their need and these are reviewed 
at set intervals. We describe the cluster model in more detail 
under “Methods” section.
Providers of services would be paid for the care a patient 
receives whilst assigned to a cluster for a defined review 
period or episode of care. Episodic payment therefore links a 
provider’s payment closely to the volume and type of mental 
health care activity that it supplies in such a way that the 
provider would know in advance how much each patient-
cluster-period will yield it in terms of income (NHS Eng-
land and NHS Improvement 2016) but nevertheless builds 
in flexibility as patients are reviewed. Fixed prices, agreed 
locally between commissioners and providers, are set for 
each cluster-episode. Alternatively, national average costs 
can be used to derive a national prospective fixed price.
Ultimately, an agreed payment rate needs to consider 
how prices relate to costs and the potential (perverse) 
incentives for care delivery (Jacobs 2014). A prospective 
fixed-price mechanism has found favour in many health 
care systems especially in regard to paying for acute hos-
pital care (O’Reilly et al. 2012) but remains limited in 
mental health care as it is more difficult to define and cost 
an episode of care due to the interplay of such factors as 
the diversity of diagnosis, and the chronic and fluctuating 
nature of much mental illness (Wolff et al. 2016; Jacobs 
et al. 2015).
A key consideration for the viability of the episodic 
payment approach is in limiting the variation in costs asso-
ciated with the defined payment categories. Cost varia-
tion needs to be considered both among patients within a 
given category or cluster and between providers for a given 
cluster. In considering the appropriate unit of activity for 
mental health services, the primary consideration is cost 
variation within the unit of activity since if this variation 
was minimal then all providers would produce at the same 
cost. However, for a given specification of categories, both 
forms of variation are important and if either is too great, 
problems may ensue. First, if a cluster captures a very 
diverse group of patients, there are a number of risks asso-
ciated with setting a single price. Patients within the group 
who are exceptionally costly to treat are potentially loss-
making to the provider. There is an incentive to treat only 
cheaper patients (“cream skimming”), refer more costly 
ones to other providers (“dumping”), or to reduce the treat-
ments given to try and contain their cost (“skimping”) 
(Jacobs 2014). Unnecessarily moving people to another 
cluster in order to obtain higher income (cluster “creep”), 
is another option. Hence, excessive variation of cost within 
a treatment group is concerning (Moscelli et al. 2019).
The impact of variability of cost between providers is 
not straightforward. On the one hand a fixed price acts as 
an incentive for high-cost providers to control their costs so 
that ex ante variability in costs may not be a great concern in 
the medium to longer term. Alternatively, variation in costs 
across providers might indicate variation in their case mix 
and setting a uniform price based on average costs across 
providers might drive high cost, high quality providers who 
treat difficult patients into financial distress.
Therefore, for an episodic payment system to work, there 
should not be too much variation in costs between providers, 
or within clusters. There needs to be reasonable resource 
homogeneity within groups (both in terms of activity and 
costs) i.e. clusters should comprise patients who are homog-
enous in terms of resource use and ultimately cost. Some 
observed variation could be the result of poor data quality, 
and some may be due to legitimate variation in patient care. 
Either way, excessive variation in activity within each cluster 
will drive very high cost variation and hinder translation into 
a prospective cluster price, which will make the operation of 
an episodic payment approach difficult.
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Purpose of the Study
Using data on cluster assignments, costs and activity for all 
patients in contact with secondary mental health care ser-
vices in England in the financial year 2014/15 we examine 
variation in costs and activity within clusters and between 
providers. We make three specific contributions. First, we 
provide an analysis of the type and variation of activity 
undertaken within care clusters, for example, the contacts 
with health care professionals which patients have. Second, 
we provide an assessment of how well clusters operate as a 
unit of activity in terms of categorising patients into resource 
homogenous groups. Third, by using the national admin-
istrative data which is intended to underpin the payment 
approach, we provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
proposed episodic payment system for England. Our results 
enable key policy lessons to be drawn for the future develop-
ment of the payment approach.
Methods
Data
We use two main sources of data, the Mental Health Mini-
mum Data Set (MHMDS) (Health & Social Care Informa-
tion Centre) and Reference Costs (Department of Health 
2015), for the financial year 2014/15.1 The MHMDS is a 
patient-level dataset with national coverage of all secondary 
mental health care for England and contains demographic, 
diagnostic and treatment information. The MHMDS con-
tains data on the items of the Mental Health Clustering Tool 
(MHCT) which is used by a clinician or clinical team to 
assign a patient to one of 21 care clusters following guid-
ance for scores on MHCT items (Monitor and NHS England 
2013b). The MHCT consists of 18 items; the 13 items of the 
Health of the Nation Outcomes Scales (HoNOS) (Wing et al. 
1994) and the five items of the Summary Assessment of Risk 
and Need (SARN) (Self et al. 2008, Self and Painter 2009). 
These are used to assess a patient’s need on both a current 
and historical basis. Each item is rated by staff on a scale of 
0, no problems, to 4, severe to very severe problems. Clini-
cians or clinical teams then translate these scores according 
to guidance (Self et al. 2008, Self and Painter 2009) into 
assignments to the 21 clusters which reflect assessments of 
specific symptoms as well as needs and chronicity. Concep-
tually, these clusters are grouped into three super-clusters: 
non-psychotic (clusters 1–8), psychotic (clusters 10–17), and 
organic (clusters 18–21) (see Table 1). Cluster 9 is desig-
nated blank and not used, and 0 is a variance cluster, used 
to code someone on a short-term basis who cannot at that 
time be classified into one of the other 20 clusters but who 
does need some mental health treatment/support (Monitor 
and NHS England 2013a).
The intention for these clusters was to group patients 
according to similar symptoms and needs and that these 
would be associated with similar sets of interventions or 
care packages (Royal College of Psychiatrists 2014). The 
clusters were developed according to a classification system 
of service users based on the similarity of their current needs 
and the similarity of their care plans (Self and Painter 2009).
Cluster-episodes are periods of time a patient spends 
assigned to the same cluster and these periods can comprise 
admitted (inpatient care) and non-admitted days (e.g. out-
patient attendances, contacts with health care profession-
als in the community). The clusters are mutually exclusive 
meaning that a patient should only be assigned to one at any 
given time.
The system requires patients to be reviewed and re-
assigned to clusters or discharged according to cluster 
review periods (see Table 1). If a person’s condition dete-
riorates and needs increase, they can be moved to a higher 
need cluster before the end of the review period of their 
current cluster. They should not be allocated to lower need 
clusters before designated review periods if their condition 
improves before then. National guidance specifies the fixed 
review periods for each cluster, though the actual duration 
of cluster-episodes does not necessarily reflect the review 
periods listed in Table 1, since after a review for a cluster-
episode it can be decided that the patient should continue in 
the same cluster.
The MHMDS also records the activity which takes place 
while a patient is assigned to a Cluster. We focus on two 
types of activity: days spent admitted to hospital and days 
when the patient had contact with a health care professional. 
We remove observations where the number of admitted days 
is greater than the length of the cluster-episode. We count 
days with contact with a health care professional rather than 
all health care contacts because we observe cases with sev-
eral contacts with health care professionals in the same day, 
which up to a point is feasible, for example a patient could 
have an appointment with two different types of staff, but is 
unlikely to have more than ten contacts on a day, which is 
observed for a small number of patients.
Reference Costs are a mandatory national data return for 
NHS providers in which they report their costs by cluster and 
by admitted and non-admitted days. These two cost meas-
ures (relating to admitted and non-admitted days) are avail-
able both at provider level and national level, with the latter 
reflecting the average of the costs reported by all providers.
1 In September 2014 the MHMDS was replaced by the Mental 
Health and Learning Disabilities Dataset (MHLDDS), therefore the 
data for the financial year 2014/15 comes from these two datasets.
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Statistical Analysis
We undertake two analyses. First, we analyse the variation 
between mental health providers in terms of their costs and 
activity. Second, we analyse the variation within clusters in 
terms of costs and activity.
Our unit of analysis in both cases is the cluster-episode, 
which records the time a patient spends assigned to one clus-
ter.2 For each cluster-episode we observe its cluster number 
(see Table 1), its length ( epidaysc ) and the activity that takes 
place during it. We focus on two types of activity: length of 
stay or days spent admitted to hospital ( warddaysc ) and days 
when the patient had contact with a health care professional 
( hpcondaysc ). The cluster number is used to match the cor-
responding (provider level and national average) costs, for 
admitted and non-admitted days, to each cluster-episode.
The cost for each cluster episode can be calculated as the 
sum of two costs, one for admitted days and the other for 
non-admitted days:
where warddaysc is the number of admitted days and 
nonadm
c
 is the number of non-admitted days while assigned 
to cluster c , rc
adm,c
 is the cost of an admitted day and rc
nonadm,c
 
is the cost of a non-admitted day in cluster c obtained from 
Reference Costs. Since we have two types of cost, one at 
provider level and a national average, we can calculate two 
versions of the cost described in Eq. (1) for each provider, 
one based on the provider’s own costs and one based on a 
national average cost (i.e. a notional fixed price which could 
be used under an episodic payment approach).
The provider-level cost and the national average cost in 
turn can be used to calculate a cost index for each provider.
(1)Cc = warddaysc ∗ rcadm,c + nonadmc ∗ rcnonadm,c
(2)
∑
∀c C
p
c∑
∀c C
NA
c
=
∑
∀c
�
warddaysc ∗ rc
p
adm,c
+ nonadmc ∗ rc
p
nonadm,c
�
∑
∀c
�
warddaysc ∗ rc
NA
adm,c
+ nonadmc ∗ rc
NA
nonadm,c
�
Table 1  Super-classes, clusters and review periods
This table combines information from Table 1 (clusters and their review periods) and Figure 1 (super-classes and Clusters) from the “Mental 
health currencies and payment: 2014/15 guidance” (Monitor and NHS England 2013a)
Superclass Cluster number Cluster label Cluster review 
period (maxi-
mum)
Variance cluster 0 Variance 6 months
Non-psychotic 1 Common mental health problems (low severity) 12 weeks
2 Common mental health problems 15 weeks
3 Non-psychotic (moderate severity) 6 months
4 Non-psychotic (severe) 6 months
5 Non-psychotic (very severe) 6 months
6 Non-psychotic disorders of overvalued Ideas 6 months
7 Enduring non-psychotic disorders (high disability) Annual
8 Non-psychotic chaotic and challenging disorders Annual
N/A 9 Blank cluster N/A
Psychosis 10 First episode in psychosis Annual
11 Ongoing recurrent psychosis (low symptoms) Annual
12 Ongoing or recurrent psychosis (high disability) Annual
13 Ongoing or recurrent psychosis (high symptom and disability) Annual
14 Psychotic crisis 4 weeks
15 Severe psychotic depression 4 weeks
16 Dual diagnosis (substance abuse and mental illness) 6 months
17 Psychosis and affective disorder difficult to engage 6 months
Organic 18 Cognitive impairment (low need) Annual
19 Cognitive impairment or dementia (moderate need) 6 months
20 Cognitive impairment or dementia (high need) 6 months
21 Cognitive impairment or dementia (high physical need or engagement) 6 months
2 Cluster-episodes can go over two financial years which run from 1 
April to 31 March (e.g. a cluster-episode can start in January and end 
in May). We consider cluster-episodes that start during the financial 
year 2014/15, and for cluster-episodes that did not record an end date, 
we impute as end date the end of the financial year, i.e. on 31st March 
2015.
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where warddaysc is the number of days spent as an inpa-
tient and nonadm
c
 is the number of non-admitted days while 
assigned to cluster c . Costs differ in their superscript, p indi-
cates provider level and NA national average, rc
adm,c
 is the 
cost of an admitted day and rc
nonadm,c
 is the cost of a non-
admitted day in cluster c . The index is then the provider-
level average cluster costs where values of the index above 
1 represent high cost providers while those below 1 are rela-
tively low cost providers.
When analysing the variation in activity within clus-
ters, we investigate whether longer cluster-episodes of care 
translate into proportionally more activity. This is relevant 
because activity drives costs and if activity is not propor-
tional to the length of a cluster-episode the payment for a 
period of care would have to vary over the treatment period 
(e.g. pay more at the start of the treatment than at the end). 
Large within-cluster variation in activity could indicate that 
clusters are not resource homogenous. We use multilevel 
regressions (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) to reflect the 
hierarchical nature of the data. For all clusters, we consider a 
three-level model, where cluster-episodes are nested within 
patients and patients are nested within providers and report 
the results as elasticities, i.e. as the proportional change 
in activity for a proportional change in the length of the 
cluster-episode.
We regress the number of days with activity (i.e. ward 
days and contacts with health care professionals) on the 
length of a cluster-episode to obtain the correlation between 
the length of the cluster-episode and the activity performed 
in it. In both cases, the explanatory variable is the length 
of the cluster-episode. If all providers delivered the same 
services per period of time in a cluster (for example, 1 year), 
but reported it at different intervals (for example, quarterly 
or bi-annually), we would expect longer cluster-episodes to 
translate into proportionally more services delivered e.g. 
more contacts with health care professionals in comparison 
to shorter cluster-episodes. These regression coefficients are 
reported as elasticities and if activity within cluster-episodes 
is proportional to their length, we anticipate elasticities to 
be around one, i.e. longer (shorter) cluster-episodes of care 
translate into proportionally more (less) activity.
Equation  (3) shows the regression for admitted days 
( warddayscij ). The explanatory variable is the length of the 
cluster-episode ( epidayscij ), clusters ( c ) are nested within 
patients ( i ) and patients are nested within providers ( j ). We 
do not consider explanatory variables at the patient or pro-
vider levels, but these levels are reflected in the random 
intercepts 휁
(2)
ij
 for patient-provider combinations and 휁
(3)
j
 for 
providers, which are assumed to have a mean of zero. The 
regression for days with contact with a health care profes-
sional ( hpcondays ) is identical to Eq. (3) except for a switch 
in the dependent variable.
As a sensitivity analysis, we restrict the sample to finished 
(with recorded end date) cluster-episodes where patients can 
be either discharged from care or moved to another cluster-
episode. We also estimate the model using only two levels 
(cluster-episodes nested within providers). All statistical 
analyses were carried out in Stata 13 (StataCorp. 2013).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample. Note 
that the number of observations for the provider reported 
costs (superscript p ) is smaller than for the national average 
costs (superscript NA ). This is because the provider level 
costs were not available for all providers but we can still 
match the national averages to their activity.
Patients spent on average 3½ months in a cluster, with 
2 days as an inpatient on a ward and had contact with a 
health care professional for 7 days. On average, cost for inpa-
tient care was around £365 per day whilst care in the com-
munity or as an outpatient was £10 per day. It is evident from 
(3)warddayscij = 훽0 + 훽1 ∗ epidayscij + 휖cij + 휁
(2)
ij
+ 휁
(3)
j
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Not all providers report Reference Costs for all the Clusters, therefore the cost variables at provider level have fewer observations than the 
national ones. All costs are for the financial year 2014/15
Variable Description (unit of measurement) Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
epidaysc Days in cluster (days) 988,648 109.3 86.0 91.3 1.0 365.0
warddaysc Days admitted to hospital (days) 988,648 2.5 0.0 13.5 0.0 364.0
rc
NA
adm,c
National average cost admitted days (£) 988,648 361.9 360.0 18.4 324.2 396.4
rc
NA
nonadm,c
National average cost non-admitted days (£) 988,648 9.2 8.1 5.9 3.4 37.3
rc
p
adm,c
Provider level cost admitted days (£) 967,848 365.6 358.7 90.3 6.3 1,456.5
rc
p
nonadm,c
Provider level cost non-admitted days (£) 985,139 10.1 8.6 10.6 0.2 427.5
hpcondaysc Days with contact with a health care professional (days) 988,648 6.6 3.0 10.3 0.0 356.0
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Table 2 that there is a huge amount of variation between 
providers in terms of costs, activity and length of stay.
Descriptive statistics for each cluster are shown in 
Table 3. It shows the distribution of the cluster-episodes 
across the different care clusters. The largest are clusters 4, 
18 and 19 with around 12% of cluster-episodes, while cluster 
3 has around 9% of cluster-episodes allocated to it.
Cost Index
Table 4 shows the cost index, as calculated in Eq. (2), for 
each provider. We observe that the highest-cost provider 
is 58% above average and the lowest-cost provider is 27% 
below average, resulting in a ratio between the maximum 
cost and the minimum cost of 2.16.
Table 5 shows the maximum and minimum cost index for 
each cluster, and the ratio between them. We observe that the 
clusters where the difference between most and least expen-
sive provider is greatest, are clusters 0, 1, 2 and 3 where the 
minimum index is < 25%, giving rise to variation within 
clusters of more than 20-fold between most- and least-cost 
providers.
Activity Regressions
Table 6 shows the multi-level model regression results for 
ward days and Table 7 for days with contact with health 
care professionals. The results are based on the regression 
of Eq. (3), using the two different dependent variables (ward 
days and contacts with health care professionals), employing 
a post-estimation command in Stata (margins) to obtain the 
results as elasticities. For both dependent variables all elas-
ticities are significant and smaller than one, which indicates 
that longer cluster-episodes do not translate into proportion-
ally more activity.
The results are robust to the sensitivity analyses that 
restricted the sample to include only finished cluster-epi-
sodes and used a two-level model (cluster-episodes nested 
within providers).
Discussion
Contribution to the Current Evidence Base
This paper has explored the proposed episodic payment 
approach for mental health services in England whereby 
clinicians allocate patients into one of 21 clusters on 
the basis of similar levels of need using the MHCT. For 
this episodic payment system to work effectively, there 
should not be too much variation in costs or resource use 
either within clusters, or between providers. We tested 
whether the existing unit of activity, namely clusters, 
which underpin the collection of mental health activity 
and cost data amongst English mental health providers, 
would support the new payment system. Specifically, we 
examined the variation both within clusters and between 
mental health providers in terms of their costs and activ-
ity/resource use.
We contribute to the evidence base by examining the 
implementation of care clusters as a unit of activity in 
mental health, with a key need being more robust analysis 
of cluster data. Our results suggest a large amount of vari-
ation between providers in terms of costs, activity rates 
and length of stay within clusters. There is substantial 
variability between providers in the length of cluster epi-
sodes, and there is huge variability within clusters in terms 
of the proportion of inpatient days and the proportion of 
contact with health care professionals. We find longer 
cluster episodes do not translate into proportionally more 
activity in terms of either inpatient days or contacts with 
health care professionals. With high levels of variation 
within clusters, accurate baseline activity rates cannot be 
determined for planning and purchasing care. Variation in 
activity rates means that providers see different numbers 
of patients, have different treatment approaches, levels of 
productivity, and put different care pathways and packages 
of care in place for patients within each cluster. This could 
lead to differences in care quality and outcomes across 
providers, generating potential geographic inequalities 
for patients. While the average costs per cluster (Table 5) 
broadly correspond to severity as indicated by the cluster 
labels (Table 1), there is also enormous variation within 
clusters in terms of costs. Variations in cost mean that 
patients with similar levels of need may be using different 
levels of resource, leading to a potential waste of scarce 
resources or an under-treatment of some people in some 
localities. This also suggests that the introduction of an 
episodic payment approach would result in large variation 
across providers in terms of their financial positions.
Our findings of significant heterogeneity in costs, and 
significant heterogeneity in terms of resource use, do not 
bode well for an episodic payment approach which requires 
resource homogeneity within clusters. The reduction of 
variation in care, activity levels and costs is pivotal to the 
establishment of a well-designed classification and payment 
system.
Of course, some of the variation we have found could be a 
result of data quality issues, including poor costing systems, 
poor coding, and differing allocation of patients to clusters 
between individual clinicians and providers. Even if this is 
the case, it still does not augur well for an episodic payment 
system since until the data quality issues are resolved, the 
analysis underpinning it will result in inappropriate pay-
ments to providers.
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics by cluster
For variable definitions see Table 2
Cluster Cluster-episodes epidaysc (days) warddaysc (days) rc
NA
adm,c
 (£) rcNA
nonadm,c
 (£) rc
p
adm,c
 (£) rc
p
nonadm,c
 (£) hpcondaysc (days)
Number % Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
0 11,563 1.17 74.9 85.3 0.8 7.3 324.2 0.0 4.3 0.0 309.4 116.0 8.1 7.5 3.2 5.4
1 21,291 2.15 50.6 65.6 0.6 4.2 346.9 0.0 5.7 0.0 353.4 147.8 8.3 4.6 2.6 4.0
2 26,647 2.70 69.7 76.4 0.6 5.3 329.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 334.1 136.6 7.7 4.7 3.1 5.1
3 86,234 8.72 90.5 83.6 0.9 6.8 345.4 0.0 7.4 0.0 341.1 77.5 7.9 3.7 4.4 7.0
4 114,109 11.54 103.8 84.5 1.2 8.6 345.8 0.0 8.7 0.0 350.0 65.0 9.0 3.1 6.3 8.5
5 48,274 4.88 95.0 85.5 3.1 14.2 342.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 348.7 55.5 13.6 4.4 8.2 10.6
6 22,451 2.27 113.1 87.1 1.7 10.7 342.7 0.0 10.4 0.0 349.6 62.2 11.1 4.1 8.0 10.2
7 54,671 5.53 124.6 97.6 2.0 12.2 347.8 0.0 9.8 0.0 353.5 70.5 10.1 3.0 8.3 11.4
8 48,131 4.87 104.0 94.2 2.9 13.4 369.1 0.0 13.7 0.0 363.3 75.9 14.1 4.6 9.3 13.1
10 27,553 2.79 113.9 95.4 4.9 17.9 361.6 0.0 17.2 0.0 355.4 59.9 17.8 5.3 11.5 13.7
11 65,760 6.65 131.8 99.7 1.9 11.8 348.9 0.0 8.1 0.0 356.9 58.0 8.6 2.5 8.0 11.1
12 59,551 6.02 133.6 100.6 4.0 17.9 369.3 0.0 11.7 0.0 365.9 73.7 12.3 3.7 10.7 14.3
13 36,559 3.70 124.1 99.5 8.8 27.5 357.6 0.0 15.3 0.0 365.6 62.8 16.1 6.2 12.5 16.3
14 21,724 2.20 44.2 56.1 12.9 21.2 396.4 0.0 37.3 0.0 400.9 91.8 49.8 43.8 8.3 10.6
15 5960 0.60 59.0 67.6 9.9 21.2 369.6 0.0 21.5 0.0 367.5 81.4 29.0 18.9 8.3 10.9
16 11,816 1.20 106.2 85.4 6.2 20.8 366.9 0.0 14.5 0.0 368.9 64.0 15.5 6.1 10.8 14.6
17 15,895 1.61 111.8 80.8 8.2 25.4 360.0 0.0 21.5 0.0 362.3 56.3 23.2 8.5 15.1 19.5
18 115,125 11.64 125.1 95.5 0.2 4.3 372.7 0.0 3.4 0.0 387.7 135.5 3.6 1.8 3.2 4.7
19 125,115 12.66 118.8 85.3 0.8 8.5 388.4 0.0 4.8 0.0 393.3 85.2 5.3 3.1 4.1 6.8
20 50,384 5.10 111.9 83.9 3.8 18.7 389.8 0.0 5.7 0.0 388.3 101.6 6.1 3.2 4.8 8.0
21 19,835 2.01 106.9 83.7 3.9 19.3 383.2 0.0 5.7 0.0 387.7 91.4 6.0 3.0 4.2 7.3
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Policy Implications
Whilst the findings from our study appear discouraging 
for the prospect of an episodic payment approach in men-
tal health, we would argue that instead of abandoning the 
episodic payment approach and clustering altogether, a 
much clearer steer is needed from policymakers to support 
providers and commissioners to move towards refining and 
developing episodic payment as a viable payment option. 
A step in this direction would be increasing investment in 
information technology and underpinning data systems 
(such as outcomes and patient level costing systems). The 
improvement of data quality needs to be a priority in mental 
health services, since without robust evidence regarding the 
incurred costs, building any kind of payment system is an 
impossible task.
Another step could be re-designing or refining the clusters 
to improve homogeneity, and indeed there may be a case 
for increasing the number of clusters to make them more 
resource homogenous. In the acute hospital sector it took 
more than a decade since its implementation to refine and 
develop the Payment by Results approach (Appleby et al. 
2012), and a similar development and refinement period 
could be anticipated for mental health services to ensure 
clusters are improved over time and become fit for purpose. 
Indeed the number of HRGs has increased exponentially 
over time as part of this refinement process. There has been 
significant investment in staff development, information 
Table 4  Cost Index at provider-level
Cost index provides provider-level average cluster costs. Values of the index above 1 are relatively high cost providers while those below 1 are 
relatively low cost providers
Provider Cost in £000 Cost Index Provider Cost in £000 Cost Index
Provider-level National average Provider-level National average
1 26,975 17,033 1.58 30 20,059 19,304 1.04
2 40,690 29,037 1.40 31 26,361 25,421 1.04
3 78,502 59,910 1.31 32 21,288 20,570 1.03
4 45,275 35,958 1.26 33 26,314 25,562 1.03
5 60,469 48,157 1.26 34 66,783 65,472 1.02
6 3612 2955 1.22 35 36,994 36,354 1.02
7 16,342 13,461 1.21 36 33,322 32,783 1.02
8 43,626 36,033 1.21 37 27,527 27,414 1.00
9 25,345 21,162 1.20 38 20,163 20,222 1.00
10 42,652 36,891 1.16 39 34,682 34,827 1.00
11 6550 5721 1.15 40 22,738 23,244 0.98
12 8724 7676 1.14 41 18,405 18,817 0.98
13 24,980 22,170 1.13 42 18,903 19,372 0.98
14 45,197 40,395 1.12 43 12,880 13,230 0.97
15 29,514 26,682 1.11 44 31,117 32,618 0.95
16 12,589 11,431 1.10 45 73,666 77,863 0.95
17 66,282 60,226 1.10 46 62,504 67,029 0.93
18 16,333 14,881 1.10 47 25,382 27,736 0.92
19 42,916 39,223 1.09 48 25,453 28,024 0.91
20 29,982 27,433 1.09 49 33,198 36,892 0.90
21 55,295 50,950 1.09 50 31,469 36,250 0.87
22 16,433 15,290 1.07 51 9199 10,609 0.87
23 33,401 31,448 1.06 52 21,111 24,652 0.86
24 36,384 34,405 1.06 53 48,419 57,227 0.85
25 37,095 35,152 1.06 54 44,541 54,282 0.82
26 49,820 47,362 1.05 55 17,880 21,902 0.82
27 35,761 34,060 1.05 56 24,950 34,112 0.73
28 28,875 27,559 1.05 57 36,536 50,325 0.73
29 19,259 18,483 1.04
Mean 32,469 31,461 Min 3612 2955
St. Dev. 16,840 16,212 Max 78,502 77,863
Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research 
1 3
technology and collection of cost and other data over time 
which the acute hospital sector has benefited from and is 
still learning how to gain even more from (Marini and Street 
2007).
The system also needs to implement change at a pace 
that does not risk destabilising local health economies and 
that fits with other priorities and developments in health and 
social care policy nationally and locally. Having said that, 
the slow movement within the sector around transitioning to 
alternative payment approaches and the current policy focus 
on devolving more decisions to local levels, means that this 
risk is quite low. These developments also need to bear in 
mind the evidence that developing and implementing new 
payment models is a long, complex process (ICF Consulting 
Services 2015).
Limitations and Future Research
Our research shows that it will be difficult to create a classifi-
cation and payment system with the currently available data 
(MHMDS). A key source of the variation we have identified 
is driven by poor quality data in the MHMDS e.g. duplicate 
data, missing data such as end dates, overlapping cluster-
episodes for the same patient, all which require significant 
effort and expertise to clean and use. We have specifically 
limited our analysis to measures of resource use and activity 
which could be reliably defined to ensure the robustness of 
our results. However, the data quality would improve sig-
nificantly if commissioners required all providers to use 
the MHMDS dataset for contracting and payment, rather 
than producing their own spreadsheets for such purposes, 
and this would facilitate greater national benchmarking and 
expanded research opportunities.
The cost data in particular are of a relatively poor quality 
and cannot be used at present to identify a reliable pricing 
system. For the development of any payment system, high 
quality activity and cost data would be a key requisite. Data 
quality is a significant challenge with any payment system, 
but it is at least underway for the episodic payment approach 
using clustering, collected routinely and there is evidence 
of some improvements in data quality over time in its col-
lection (Jacobs et al. 2016). Improvements to reference cost 
data are also essential and the introduction of patient level 
information costing systems (PLICS) at provider level can 
support the process of generating this. Future research may 
explore the advantages in robustness that patient level cost-
ing systems could provide compared to cluster level costing 
and whether these reduce variation within clusters. It would 
also be valuable for future research to compare and contrast 
the pros and cons of different units of activity used in pay-
ment systems internationally so that policymakers can learn 
from the design of different payment approaches.
Table 5  Average cluster-episode 
cost and cost index summary by 
cluster
Maximum and minimum cost index for each cluster across all providers
Number of 
providers
Average cluster-episode 
cost (National average) [£)
Minimum as % of 
National average
Maximum as % of 
National average
Maximum/
minimum
Cluster 0 48 571 24 490 20.55
Cluster 1 50 487 11 335 31.88
Cluster 2 51 635 2 377 179.33
Cluster 3 53 958 8 191 23.47
Cluster 4 57 1316 56 229 4.09
Cluster 5 57 2221 32 162 5.00
Cluster 6 55 1729 20 173 8.78
Cluster 7 57 1882 46 160 3.50
Cluster 8 56 2459 37 175 4.73
Cluster 10 57 3655 45 155 3.40
Cluster 11 55 1734 56 176 3.15
Cluster 12 57 2980 63 183 2.93
Cluster 13 56 4896 68 152 2.23
Cluster 14 57 6290 68 420 6.22
Cluster 15 56 4721 44 225 5.12
Cluster 16 55 3739 52 169 3.22
Cluster 17 56 5171 55 155 2.81
Cluster 18 55 512 42 284 6.76
Cluster 19 57 885 41 236 5.78
Cluster 20 57 2080 57 218 3.83
Cluster 21 56 2081 35 167 4.83
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Conclusion
Our analysis of cost and activity for all secondary mental 
health care in England in the financial year 2014/2015 has 
revealed substantial variability between providers as well 
as within clusters. While such variability in and of itself 
does not make efficient pricing arrangements impossible, our 
results indicate that a cluster-based episodic payment system 
would have substantially different financial impacts across 
providers which could destabilise local health economies. 
Our analysis further suggests that the inconsistent quality 
of the currently available mental health care cost and uti-
lization data in England will make it difficult to create a 
fair and accurate episodic pricing system for mental health 
care. Greater investment in developing more accurate and 
consistent information and costing systems for health care 
may be needed to support such episodic payment systems 
in the future.
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Table 6  Three-level regression model for ward days
Ward days is the dependent variable. Length of cluster-episode is the 
explanatory variable. Levels are cluster-episodes—patient—provider. 
Elasticity = (proportional change in ward days)/(proportional change 
in length of cluster-episode)
Elasticity Std. Err. p value N
Cluster 0 0.2418 0.0501 < 0.01 11,563
Cluster 1 0.1568 0.0315 < 0.01 21,291
Cluster 2 0.2267 0.0374 < 0.01 26,647
Cluster 3 0.1449 0.0250 < 0.01 86,234
Cluster 4 0.1410 0.0214 < 0.01 114,109
Cluster 5 0.2174 0.0215 < 0.01 48,274
Cluster 6 0.1422 0.0459 < 0.01 22,451
Cluster 7 0.1681 0.0292 < 0.01 54,671
Cluster 8 0.1858 0.0200 < 0.01 48,131
Cluster 10 0.2199 0.0228 < 0.01 27,553
Cluster 11 0.1167 0.0260 < 0.01 65,760
Cluster 12 0.1369 0.0197 < 0.01 59,551
Cluster 13 0.3119 0.0224 < 0.01 36,559
Cluster 14 0.3040 0.0136 < 0.01 21,724
Cluster 15 0.2417 0.0214 < 0.01 5,960
Cluster 16 0.3293 0.0342 < 0.01 11,816
Cluster 17 0.3827 0.0365 < 0.01 15,895
Cluster 18 0.2219 0.0549 < 0.01 115,125
Cluster 19 0.2393 0.0404 < 0.01 125,115
Cluster 20 0.3870 0.0407 < 0.01 50,384
Cluster 21 0.3957 0.0512 < 0.01 19,835
Table 7  Three-level regression model for days with contact with a 
health care professional
Days with contact with a health care professional is the dependent 
variable. Length of cluster-episode is the explanatory variable. Lev-
els are cluster-episodes—patient—provider. Elasticity = (proportional 
change in days with contact with a health care professional)/(propor-
tional change in length of cluster-episode)
Elasticity Std. Err. p-value N
Cluster 0 0.3589 0.0250 < 0.01 11,563
Cluster 1 0.3105 0.0133 < 0.01 21,291
Cluster 2 0.3700 0.0141 < 0.01 26,647
Cluster 3 0.4648 0.0176 < 0.01 86,234
Cluster 4 0.4957 0.0208 < 0.01 114,109
Cluster 5 0.4676 0.0186 < 0.01 48,274
Cluster 6 0.6198 0.0278 < 0.01 22,451
Cluster 7 0.6180 0.0282 < 0.01 54,671
Cluster 8 0.6181 0.0321 < 0.01 48,131
Cluster 10 0.6758 0.0378 < 0.01 27,553
Cluster 11 0.6298 0.0264 < 0.01 65,760
Cluster 12 0.6288 0.0293 < 0.01 59,551
Cluster 13 0.6208 0.0311 < 0.01 36,559
Cluster 14 0.3827 0.0235 < 0.01 21,724
Cluster 15 0.3663 0.0233 < 0.01 5,960
Cluster 16 0.6381 0.0430 < 0.01 11,816
Cluster 17 0.8204 0.0793 < 0.01 15,895
Cluster 18 0.5004 0.0219 < 0.01 115,125
Cluster 19 0.4613 0.0233 < 0.01 125,115
Cluster 20 0.4571 0.0269 < 0.01 50,384
Cluster 21 0.4232 0.0322 < 0.01 19,835
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